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September 28, 1955

*PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES USED BY THE
FBI IN CONTROLLING PERSONNEL CLEARED
FOR ACCESS TO COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE*

*A. Pre-access checking and background investigating
procedures and practices:*

The Bureau conducts a very thorough background investigation of all its employees prior to the time they are hired and that, predicated upon this investigation, the Bureau clears its personnel having the necessary "need-to-know," for access to communications intelligence. Background investigation includes thorough checks of the individual's background, references, acquaintances, education, and other qualifications.

*B. Methods of supervision, control, security education
and inspection of Comint personnel:*

Only a relatively small number of FBI personnel are cleared for access to communications intelligence. Comint material is delivered directly to a special unit which handles this material and only those individuals in the unit plus certain FBI administrative officials have access to the material. The personnel in the special unit are carefully selected supervisory personnel at FBI Headquarters, who are a part of the Espionage Section, of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Comint material received by the unit is filed within the confines of the unit area and the information is not released to the general indices.

*C. Means by which the potential damage a faulty employee
could do can be minimized:*

It is the opinion of the FBI that the only way to minimize the potential damage which a faulty employee might cause, can be controlled only by providing close supervision, tight control, and frequent inspection as a protection against such an employee.

FBI Review Decision on File

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D-E. Conclusions as to the adequacy and/or inadequacy of present USCIB personnel security standards and practices, and recommendations for improving said standards and practices, if deemed inadequate

The FBI would prefer to advance no conclusions at this time as to the adequacy or inadequacy of present USCIB personnel security standards and practices until such time as the facts are presented to the Committee for study.

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